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Toxicology and Terrorism
Recently, a new chapter was started in the handbook of terror
involving the application ofnerve gas technology to the killing of
civilians. On March 19, a terrorist attack in a Tokyo subway
resulted in the loss of 10 lives and injury to over 5,000 others. In
view ofthe lethality ofthe suspected agent, sarin, the fatalities were
surprisingly few. Terrorist attacks on civilians are not new, but
what was unique about this particular attack was the use ofa nerve
agent instead of the customary conventional weapons. The possi-
bility that nerve agents can be used against a vulnerable civilian
population is alarming. A new era has begun, and we would be
remiss if we did not learn from this one attack and take steps to
prepare for the next. There is no doubt that those involved in the
use ofterror will learn from their mistakes and become more effec-
tive in their deployment ofthese horrific weapons.
From a public perspective there are several questions that must
be urgently addressed. What can we do to prevent such attacks and
how do we respond ifsuch an attack should occur? Can we prevent
terrorist organizations from making nerve agents? How do we pre-
vent them from delivering these agents to their targets? Is there
anything that we as a society can do to protect ourselves in the
event ofa gas attack? How do we minimize our vulnerability? How
do we respond to an attack? All ofthese questions are very difficult
to answer.
Agents like GB (sarin), GA (tabun), and VX are easily synthe-
sized; however, handling, storage, and delivery of these agents is
not quite so simple. Knowledge for performing these tasks is com-
monplace, and I suspect that any third-year chemistry student
could design and build a facility for their production. Clearly, we
cannot restrict access to information. Chemical&-EngineeringNews
responded to the March 19 attack by showing the reader how easy
it is to synthesize sarin from dimethylmethylphosphonate (1). The
information is in the textbooks, and like most technical informa-
tion, the methodology for the production ofnerve gases is not con-
trollable, even ifonewanted to.
Nerve gases are highly toxic organophosphate esters chemically
similar to the organophosphate pesticides but with substantially
higher acute toxicities. For example, the LD50 (mg/kg) for rats via
dermal exposures is only 0.1 for VX, 2.5 for GB (sarin), but 6.8 for
the pesticide parathion, 4,000 for sevin, and 4,400 for malathion
(2). In comparison, for humans the estimated dermal LD50 values
for VX, GB, and GA are about 0.09, 24, and 18 mg/kg, respective-
ly(2).
Could the raw materials involved in the manufacture of
organophosphates be regulated and controlled as a means of pre-
venting terrorist organizations from synthesizing nerve agents?
Unfortunately, the starting materials are very common and easily
obtained. As pointed out in Nature (3), legitimate chemical manu-
facturers are reluctant to disclose their use ofraw materials, and the
idea that pyrophosphate or phosphoric acid could be taken offthe
free market is quite unrealistic.
Delivery ofweapons onto passenger aircraft has been, to a large
degree, prevented by use ofscanning equipment. Judging from the
reduction in the number ofhighjackings in recent years, this moni-
toring program has been highly successful. Perhaps we could estab-
lish a similar program for screening all subway passengers or for
screening all people who attend large, indoor functions. Imagine
the New York subway at rush hour as passengers passed through
checkpoints. The sheer number ofpeople involved suggests that a
screening program would be extremely difficult to establish. Such
securitywould be needed not only in the underground itselfbut also
in all outlying stations and in the maintenance facilities. It would
certainly be an immense, although not impossible, task, and if ter-
rorist attacks on commuter facilities become commonplace there
might come a time when such a system has to be instituted.
Deployment of nerve gases against civilian populations might be
minimized by using appropriate detection devices in conjunction
with appropriately trained security forces. Perhaps dogs might be
trained to detect nerve gases which to humans seem odorless. The
problems are similar to those encountered in preventing the deploy-
ment ofterrorist bombs.
There are several reasonably effective antidotes to nerve gases.
GB, GA, and VX are all organophosphates that, like their less toxic
pesticide cousins, inhibit acetylcholinesterase, resulting in the accu-
mulation of acetylcholine at the nerve synapses. Accumulation of
acetylcholine results in the overstimulation of parts of the nervous
system that control smooth muscle, cardiac muscle, and exocrine
glandular function. In general, death results from respiratory failure.
Several agents can antagonize the accumulation of acetylcholine.
Atropine when used in conjunction with oximes such as prali-
doxime, obidoxime, or trimedoxime (4) may prevent and reverse, to
a degree, the central nervous system effects of the nerve gases. The
problem is that atropine and the oximes are themselves highly toxic
and they should be administered to a victim ofa gas attack only by
trained personnel (4). It would not be possible for the general popu-
lation to carry such toxic agents and to self-administer them in the
event ofa gas attack. In addition, nerve gas exposure could result in
mental confusion, dizziness, nausea, and vomiting, and self-adminis-
tration under such circumstances would be highly risky.
It is unlikely that, in the event ofa terrorist attack on a civilian
population, emergency personnel could respond with appropriate
equipment and antidotes in less than 30 minutes, even if antidotes
and other materials were available in the quantities projected. With
agents that can kill in seconds, 30 minutes after the gas is in the air
is too late. In view of the complexities involved, it seems unlikely
that an attack on civilian lives in a crowded public place could be
prevented. However, we can act to minimize casualties which are to
a degree determined by the nature of our responses and the speed
with which they are put in place. Emergency and medical personnel,
especially those in cities where large numbers ofpeople congregate at
certain times, should be trained to deal with terrorist attacks involv-
ing nerve agents. Such personnel should have on hand substances
that might limit the toxicity ofnerve and/or blistering agents in suf-
ficient quantities to treat thousands ofpeople. Equipment and pro-
tective clothing for emergency and medical personnel should also be
available.
One approach that might help reduce the number of casualties
in the event ofgas attacks in crowded public buildings involves the
use ofsprinkler systems. GB, GA, and VX are all miscible with water
(2), and washing with weakly alkaline solutions is part ofthe proto-
col established by the military for the decontamination ofpersonnel
exposed to nerve gases (4). Most public buildings in the United
States have sprinkler systems installed in the event of fire. Perhaps
sprinklers could be deployed almost immediately as a means ofcon-
fining the released gas and reducing its concentration. In the absence
ofdecontamination kits, washing with copious amounts ofwater or
weak alkaline solutions could remove the nerve agent or at least
reduce its concentration in the air.
Suppose that a room containing 1,000 people, were exposed to
an air concentration ofnerve gas sufficiently high to transfer a dose
of agent to each of the occupants equal to the LD50, then 500 of
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those people would die. However, if the concentration of agent in
the air could be reduced by 50%, assuming a linear dose response,
then fatalities would be reduced to 250, a saving of250 lives. It is
unlikely that a sprinkler system could remove nerve gas from the air
with 100% efficiency, but many lives might be saved even with only
partial removal of the gas. Experiments could easily be designed to
test the hypothesis and with appropriate modifications to sprinkler
systems, perhaps involving flow rates and droplet sizes, rendered
optimally effective in removing toxic agents from the air. In addi-
tion, sprinkler systems could be coupled with nerve gas detectors
such as the time-of-flight mass spectrometers currently under devel-
opment at Johns Hopkins or the surface acoustic wave sensors cur-
rently being developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and
thereby reduce the response time possibly to within seconds of the
initial gas release.
It seems reasonable to suppose that ifnerve gas attacks in crowd-
ed, enclosed spaces could be blunted through use of sprinkler sys-
teams coupled with specific detection devices, then the presence of
such a system might, itself, be a major deterrent. After all, there
would be little point in carrying out an attack ifits chances ofsuc-
cess were substantially reduced.
Gary E. R. Hook
Co-Editor-in-Chief
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The XIVth World Congress on Occupational Safety and Health will be held in Madrid from April 22 to April 26, 1996.
The organizers are the Spanish Ministry ofLabour and Social Security, through the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (INSHT), the International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva, and the International Social Security
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The XIVthWorld Congress, tobe held in Madrid, aims tobe an open forum forallpersons involved inriskprevention at
work, safety and health safety specialists, occupational health physicians, labour inspectors, persons directly concerned
with safety and health at work, including entrepreneurs and managers in enterprises, trade union representatives,
manufacturers and importers, as well as heads ofpublic administration and social security administrators.
The main focus ofthis Congress will be on the consequences for occupational safety and health ofprocesses ofinterna-
tional and regional integration (e.g. EU, NAFTA) and ofthe globalization ofeconomic relations, on an in-depthanalysis
ofchemical risks and on new proposals for cooperation and participation within enterprises. Other specific issues will
also be dealt with, such as training and information, control of working conditions or new responsibilities. Special
emphasis willbe placed on small and medium-sized enterprises and sectors facingspecific problems withregard to safe-
ty and health atwork, such asthe construction sectorand agriculture.
In addition, as part of this Congress, the International Section "Electricity" of the ISSA will be organizing the 3rd
International Film and Video Festival on Occupational Safety and Health.
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